Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
Law Faculty Articles and Essays

Faculty Scholarship

8-1986

New Rules for Zoning Adult Uses: The Supreme Court's Renton
Decision
Alan Weinstein
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, a.weinstein@csuohio.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Land Use Law Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Repository Citation
Weinstein, Alan, "New Rules for Zoning Adult Uses: The Supreme Court's Renton Decision" (1986). Law
Faculty Articles and Essays. 1057.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles/1057

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of
EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact research.services@law.csuohio.edu.

Commentary

New Rules for
Zoning Adult Uses:
The Supreme Court's
Renton Decision
By Alan Weinstein

This term, for the third time in 10 years, the U.S. Supreme
Court considered the validity of zoning that restricts the loca
tion or operation of businesses that trade in sexually oriented
books, magazines, movies, or entertainment. Restrictions on
such "adult businesses" raise serious constitutional issues
because the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech
extends to sexually oriented media so long as the material is not
considered obscene. In the latest case, City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, 106 S.Ct. 925 (1986), 38 ZD 258, the Court
upheld a zoning ordinance that limited the location of theaters
exhibiting adult movies to a 520-acre area in one corner of the
city. This ruling provides new guidance to courts called on to
review zoning that regulates adult businesses and marks a sig
nificant departure from the rules in the large number of such
cases decided since the Supreme Court first approved adult
business zoning in its 1976 decision in Young v. American Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. SO (1976), 28 ZD 329.
Mini Theatres involved a challenge to the legality of Detroit's
"anti-Skid Row" ordinance that singled out adult bookstores
and theaters for special regulatory treatment. The Detroit or
dinance provided, inter alia, that adult theaters and bookstores
may not be located within 500 feet of a residential area or within
1,000 feet of any two other regulated uses defined as: adult
bookstores, adult theaters and minitheaters, bars, cabarets,
hotels and motels, pawnshops, billiard and pool halls, public
lodging houses, secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors, and taxi
dance halls. Detroit Ordinance 742-G (Nov. 2, 1972), amend
ing Official Zoning Ordinance of the City of Detroit Secs.
32.007, 66.0000, 66.0101 (1962). A sharply divided Supreme
Court upheld the ordinance. Justice Stevens's plurality opinion
concluded that the ordinance had only a minimal and incidental
effect on public access to adult entertainment, but noted that
the decision might be quite different if "the ordinance had the
effect of suppressing or greatly restricting access to lawful
speech."1 The Detroit scheme raised significant First Amend
ment issues because its distinctions were based on the content
of the material exhibited or sold and because it arguably in
fringed on free speech rights. Justice Stevens's opinion stressed
two factors that insulated the ordinance from constitutional at
tack. First, Detroit's effort to regulate protected forms of expres
sion apparently was motivated by a desire to avoid the
neighborhood blight caused by a concentration of adult uses
and not by a distaste for the content of the speech itself. Second,
the ordinance would not have the effect of restricting the
market for adult entertainment.
Alan Weinstein is an attorney, city planner, and professor of law at the Jacob
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In the wake of the Mini Theatres decision, many
municipalities adopted the Detroit dispersion technique to ad
dress the problems they claimed they were experiencing with
the negative effects adult businesses can have on
neighborhoods. While many of these ordinances were valid,
court challenges to several dispersion schemes revealed that
some cities either could not produce legislative findings
supporting their restrictions or adopted ordinances that had the
effect of banning or severely restricting access to adult enter
tainment. Not surprisingly, these ordinances were struck down
as violative of the First Amendment. For example, in Alexander
v. City ofMinneapolis, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983), the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated an ordinance that reduced
permissible locations for adult businesses by two-thirds.
In 1981, the Supreme Court considered a different form of
restriction on adult entertainment in Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), 33 ZD 254. The Mount
Ephraim ordinance achieved its goal of banning nude danc
ing by prohibiting all live entertainment in the community. A
sharply divided Court held that the ordinance, by banning all
live entertainment, was invalid because it intruded too far on
rights protected by the First Amendment. An interesting as
pect of the Schad case was Mount Ephraim's argument that it
need not allow live entertainment generally, and nude danc
ing in particular, within its boundaries if such adult entertain
ment is readily available in nearby communities. The Court
rejected this position, finding that the right to freedom of ex
pression in any one locale may not be abridged simply because
the right to the expression may be exercised in some other
place.
In a previous commentary, "Regulating Pornography: Re
cent Legal Trends," 34 Land Use Law & Zoning Digest, No.
2 at 4 (1982), this author concluded that the "zoning cases in
volving restrictions on adult businesses with First Amendment
protection-such as theaters and bookstores-show a clear
pattern of judicial concern with maintaining community ac
cess to such businesses." That commentary also identified four
rules that appeared to be guiding the courts' decisions: loca
tional restrictions on adult businesses would be upheld only
if the market for this commodity is essentially unrestrained;
vaguely worded ordinances were unacceptable; ordinances
that do not develop a factual basis for their restrictions or do
not relate those restrictions directly to recognized zoning pur
poses will be struck down; and, ordinances that grant govern
ment officials too-broad discretionary powers to determine
whether or not an adult business will be permitted to
operate-for example, by provisions for special permits-will
be struck down.
The Renton case makes significant changes in two of these
rules, allowing local governments more freedom when they
regulate adult businesses. Renton is silent on other rules, how
ever, and the ultimate effect of the case depends in large part
on how lower courts apply the new rulings to specific cases.
The remainder of this commentary discusses the Renton case
and explores the implications it holds for adult-business zon
ing in light of other recent state and federal court decisions.

THE RENTON DECISION
The controversy that gave rise to the Renton case began in
May 1980, when the mayor of Renton, a Seattle suburb, re
quested that the city council consider enacting adult-business
legislation. At the time, there were no adult businesses in that
Land Use Law August 1986
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city of 32, 000. The city council referred the matter to the city's
Planning and Development Committee, which held public
hearings, reviewed the experience of Seattle and other cities,
and sought the advice of the city attorney. The city council
also enacted a moratorium on the licensing of adult businesses,
explaining its action on the grounds that such businesses
"would have a severe impact upon surrounding businesses and
residences. " 2
In April 1981, the city council enacted an ordinance based
on the committee's recommendation. The ordinance
originally prohibited adult theaters from locating within 1,000
feet of any residential zone or dwelling, any church,
synagogue, or other religious institution, or any park, and
also from locating within one mile of any public or private
school. It was later amended to reduce the locational restric
tion regarding schools from one mile to 1,000 feet. In effect,
the ordinance restricted the location of adult theaters to a 520
acre area. At the time, there were no theaters located in the
520-acre area, and none of the theaters outside that area were
exhibiting adult films. In January 1982, Playtime Theatres ac
quired two movie theaters in Renton with the intention of ex
hibiting adult films at one of them. Playtime then sued in
federal district court, challenging the ordinance.
On January 11, 1983, the district court judge adopted a
federal magistrate's findings that: the ordinance "for all prac
tical purposes excludes adult theaters from the city"; Renton
had not established a factual basis for the adoption of the or
dinance; and, the motivation behind the ordinance reflected
·'simple distaste for adult theaters because of the content of the
films shown."
Playtime was granted a preliminary injunction barring en
forcement of the ordinance and, as a result, began to exhibit
adult movies. But in February, the district court vacated the
preliminary injunction and denied Playtime a permanent in
junction, thus reinstating the ordinance. The court, departing
from the magistrate's findings, found that 520 acres were
available for the location of adult theaters and that the or
dinance did not impermissibly restrict Playtime's First
Amendment rights. The court also found no improper motive
behind enactment of the ordinance and ruled that Renton
could rely on the experiences of other cities in its legislative
findings supporting the ordinance. Renton appealed.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court in a 1984 decision, Playtime Theatres v. City of Renton,
748F.2d527(9th Cir.1984), 37 ZD115. Although the appeals
court accepted the district court's finding that 520 acres re
mained outside the ordinance's locational restrictions, it did
not agree that the land was "available" for adult theaters.
Noting that a substantial part of the 520 acres was occupied
by a sewage treatment plant, a horseracing track, an industrial
park, warehouse and manufacturing facilities, an oil tank
farm, and a fully developed shopping center, the Ninth Cir
cuit found that limiting adult theaters to these areas was a
substantial restriction on speech. Thus, the Renton ordinance
stood on a different footing from the Detroit ordinance ap
proved in Mini Theatres, which did not have the effect of
restricting the number of adult theaters.
The appeals court examined the Renton ordinance under
the four-part test developed in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968), to determine the validity of a regulation that
affects freedom of expression. Under this test, a regulation is
2. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 106S.Ct. 925, 927(1986), 38ZD
258.
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constitutional only if: it is within the constitutional power of
the government; it furthers an important or substantial gov
ernmental interest; the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of speech; and the incidental restriction on
First Amendment freedom is no greater than essential to fur
ther that interest. Applying these factors to the challenged or
dinance, the court found two problems: Renton had not
demonstrated a substantial governmental interest and had not
proved that the ordinance was unrelated to the suppression of
speech. The Ninth Circuit noted that both the federal
magistrate and the district court recognized that many of the
reasons Renton offered for its ordinance ''were no more than
expressions of dislike for the subject matter. "3 On these facts,
the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether Renton could prove that suppression of
speech was not a motivating factor in its adoption of the
ordinance.
The Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit in a deci
sion that saw only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting.
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion found this case essen
tially similar to Mini Theatres as a form of content-neutral
time, place, and manner regulation. 4 While the ordinance
singled out adult theaters for separate zoning treatment, Rehn
quist argued that the ordinance was aimed "not at the content
of the films shown, but at the secondary effects of such theaters
on the surrounding community." Thus, he found that "the
Renton ordinance is completely consistent with our definition
of 'content-neutral' speech regulations as those that 'are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech."' This line of reasoning brought the case squarely
within the precedent created in Mini Theatres.
The test for such an ordinance, according to the majority,
has two parts: Does the ordinance serve a substantial govern
mental interest, and does it allow for reasonable alternative
means of communication? The major issue in the first prong
of this inquiry was whether the city of Renton was justified in
relying on the experiences of other cities in finding that adult
theaters pose a serious threat of urban deterioration. The
Ninth Circuit had ruled that, because the ordinance was
enacted without the benefit of studies specifically relating to
the "particular problems or needs of Renton," the city's
justifications for the ordinance were "conclusory and
speculative." The majority rejected this approach as impos
ing "an unnecessarily rigid burden of proof." Noting that Ren
ton had considered the"detailed findings" regarding the effects
of adult theaters in neighboring Seattle, the majority held that
"Renton was entitled to rely on the experiences of Seattle and
other cities." The majority also provided guidance for other
municipalities seeking to rely on the experience of other cities:
''The First Amendment does not require a city, before enact
ing such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce
evidence independent of that already generated by other cities,
so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses."5
3. 748 F.2d at 537-538.
4. In general, government may place reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, or manner in which speech takes place so long as the restrictions are
not related to the content of the speech.
5. 106 S.Ct. at 931. Renton had relied extensively on the summary of the
"detailed findings" of Seattle's study of the effects of adult movie theaters that
appeared in the Washington Supreme Court's opinion in Northend Cinema
v. Seattle, 585P.2d1153 (1978), 31ZD179.

Commentary
After dismissing claims that the Renton ordinance was
flawed because it chose to concentrate the location of theaters,
rather than disperse them as had Detroit, and was
underinclusive because it chose to regulate only adult theaters
and not the other kinds of adult businesses that are likely to pro
duce secondary effects, the majority addressed the second
prong of its test: whether the Renton ordinance allows for
reasonable alternative avenues of communication. There was
no question that the ordinance permitted adult theaters to
locate within a 520-acre portion of the city, but there was a
dispute over whether there were "commercially viable" sites
available for adult theaters within this restricted area. The
Ninth Circuit had found there were none and thus held that the
Renton ordinance "would result in a substantial restriction on
speech."
The majority rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion, relying
instead on the district court's finding that the 520 acres of land
consist of "[a]mple, accessible real estate," including "acreage
in all stages of development from raw land to developed, in
dustrial, warehouse, office, and shopping space that is criss
crossed by freeways, highways, and roads." Since land and
buildings were "ample" and "accessible," the majority argued
that Renton had not effectively denied the adult-theater
operators "a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an
adult theater within the city."
Adult-theater operators, the majority said, ''must fend for
themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with
other prospective purchasers and lessees. . . . [W]e have
never suggested that the First Amendment compels the govern
ment to ensure that adult theaters, or any other kinds of speech
related businesses for that matter, will be able to obtain sites at
bargain prices." The majority thus concluded that the Renton
ordinance represents a valid governmental response to the
serious problems created by adult theaters and that the city had
not used the "power to zone as a pretext for suppressing
expression."
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, labeled
the majority's analysis ''misguided." Brennan attacked the argu
ment that the Renton ordinance was aimed at the secondary ef
fects of the adult theaters and not at the content of the films
shown there. For Brennan, the fact that the ordinance imposed
"special restrictions on certain kinds of speech on the basis of
content" belied Renton' s claim that the ordinance was not
designed to suppress the content of adult movies. Not only did
the ordinance discriminate on its face against adult theaters,
but, Brennan claimed, the circumstances surrounding the adop
tion and amendment of the ordinance strongly suggested that
the ordinance was designed to suppress expression. Among
these circumstances were that: the "findings" that support the
ordinance were adopted only after the commencement of this
lawsuit; the "findings" were based primarily' on the experiences
of other cities; the city council conducted no studies and heard
no expert testimony on how the community would be affected
by the presence of an adult movie theater; and a number of
these "findings" did not relate to legitimate land use concerns,
but were no more than expressions of dislike for the subject
matter shown at adult theaters. 6
6. Brennan cited the following findings of the city council as examples of
"expressions of dislike for the subject matter":
Location of adult entertainment land uses on the main commercial thoroughfares
of the city gives an impression of legitimacy to, and causes a loss of sensitivity to,
the adverse effect of pornography upon children, established family relations,

Based on the above, Brennan concluded that the Renton or
dinance was designed to suppress expression and thus was not
to be analyzed as a content-neutral time, place, and manner
restriction. Viewed as a content-based restriction on speech,
the ordinance is constitutional, he argued, only if the city can
show that the ordinance is a precisely drawn means of serv
ing a compelling governmental interest. Applying this stan
dard to the facts of this case, Brennan found the ordinance
unconstitutional because Renton had not shown that locating
adult theaters near its churches, schools, and homes would
necessarily result in undesirable "secondary effects'' or that
these problems could not be effectively addressed by less in
trusive restrictions.
Brennan also found the ordinance unconstitutional even
assuming that it should be analyzed as a content-neutral time,
place, and manner restriction. Applying the majority's two
prong test, Brennan found that the record justifying the city's
asserted interest was insufficient to support that interest and
that the ordinance did not provide for reasonable alternative
avenues of communication. In particular, he claimed that the
majority's argument that the ordinance did nothing more than
require adult theater operators to participate in the real estate
market like anyone else was mistakeri, pointing out that adult
theater operators were not being treated the same as others,
since they were required to conduct business under severe
restrictions not imposed on others. In short, while other
businesses seeking to locate in the 520-acre area could likely
go elsewhere if economics demanded, the adult-theater
operators could not.

RENTON'S SIGNIFICANCE
Renton is an important decision for a number of reasons.
Primarily, it shows that a clear majority of the Supreme Court
now accepts the plurality's argument in Mini Theatres that
zoning ordinances may single out adult businesses for
regulatory treatment different from that accorded other types
of businesses, despite the fact that adult businesses are pro
tected by the First Amendment. Justice Rehnquist's opinion
found that the Renton ordinance was a valid content-neutral
time, place, and manner restriction because the ordinance was
aimed ·'not at the content of the films shown, but at the
secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding commu
nity." By placing adult-business zoning squarely in the cate
gory of time, place, and manner regulation, the majority
directs courts to apply Renton 's relatively lenient standard of
review to judge the validity of such ordinances, rather than the
more demanding O'Brien test. The opinion also makes clear
that both dispersion and concentration are constitutionally
valid strategies for addressing the problems of adult
businesses. Since Mini Theatres dealt only with a dispersion
ordinance, this is the first Supreme Court pronouncement on
concentration of adult uses, a technique used in Boston and
Seattle, among other cities. Local governments may now
safely adopt either a concentration or dispersion approach to
regulating adult businesses.
To explore the likely effects of the Renton decision in more
detail, it will be helpful to refer again to the four "rules" that
respect for the marital relationship and for the sanctity of marriage relations of
others, and the concept of nonaggressive, consensual sexual relations.
Location of adult land uses in close proximity to residential uses, churches, parks,
and other public facilities, and schools, will cause a degradation of the community
standards of morality. Pornographic material has a degrading effect upon the rela
tionship between spouses. 106 S.Ct. at 935, n. 3.
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appeared to guide the courts in the years after the Mini
Theatres opinion. The Renton case addresses two of these
directly: the effect of zoning on the number of ad.ult busi
nesses and the development of findings of fact to support the
ordinances.
Availability of Locations
Mini Theatres required that the market for adult entertain
ment remain "essentially unrestrained" after the enactment of
adult-business zoning. The Detroit ordinance passed this test
because the Court found that the dispersion scheme, while
prohibiting adult businesses from certain locations, would not
have the effect of diminishing the number of adult businesses
that could operate in the city. When other cities attempted to
use the dispersion technique to severely restrict or effectively
ban adult businesses, however, the lower courts were not hesi
tant to invalidate the offending ordinances.
In Basiardnes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir.
1982), 35 ZD 66, for example, a federal appeals court over
turned an adult-business ordinance because the locational
restrictions were so severe that adult businesses could operate
only under "oppressive" conditions. The court found that
adult businesses were banned in 85 to 90 percent of the city,
while the remaining areas where adult businesses could locate
were unsuited for such uses. Adult businesses were permitted
only in industrial zones that were distant from other shopping
and entertainment areas and that contained only warehouses,
shipyards, undeveloped areas, and swamps. These areas had
few roads and were "poorly lit, barren of structures suitable for
showing films, and perhaps unsafe." Based on these find
ings, the court concluded that the areas were available for
adult businesses only in theory, "but in fact they were com
pletely unsuited to this use." 7 Since the ordinance's loca
tional restrictions could readily have the effect of re_ducing the
number of adult businesses, the court struck it down.
In another case, Purple Onion v. Jackson, 511F.Supp.1207
(N.D. Ga. 1981), 34 ZD 7, a federal court struck down
Atlanta's adult business ordinance after determining that the
locational restrictions of the ordinance were so severe that
they would significantly reduce, and possibly eliminate
altogether, public access to adult entertainment. The Atlanta
ordinance was based on the dispersion scheme used in Detroit,
but extended it by restricting all new adult businesses to three
zoning districts and including an amortization provision re
quiring that certain existing adult businesses cease operating
at their current locations. The city contended that there were
enough sites available in the three zoning districts to ensure
that access to adult businesses would not be restricted. The
court refused to defer to the city's assessment and, after
carefully reviewing all the maps, documentary evidence,
photographs, and testimony regarding site availability, found
that no more than three or four sites in the restricted area
would be considered by a "reasonably prudent investor" as a
possible site for an adult business. Based on these findings, the
court ruled that the restrictions would reduce public access to
adult businesses and struck down the ordinance.
The court found sites unacceptable for a number of reasons:
the size and shape of lots precluded construction of a building;
there was no road access; surrounding noxious uses, such as
oil storage tanks and a sewage treatment plant, were incom
patible; and the present ownership or use of the site made its
7. 682F.2dat1214.
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sale or lease for use as a adult business unlikely. In making
these findings, however, the court did not consider either the
price of the land or whether the land was presently for sale.
The majority opinion in Renton rejects the approach seen
in Basiardnes and Purple Onion. In Renton, there was a con
flicting factual record on the effect of the restrictions on site
availability. The federal magistrate's finding that the or
dinance effectively excluded adult businesses was ultimately
rejected by the district court. On appeal, however, the Ninth
Circuit found that a substantial part of the 520 acres was oc
cupied by uses incompatible with adult theaters-including
a sewage treatment plant, an oil tank farm, a racetrack, and
a fully developed shopping center-and concluded that this
seriously limited the sites available for adult theaters. Justice
Rehnquist argued that, since land and buildings were "ample''
and "accessible," the ordinance was not overly restrictive:
'The First Amendment requires only that Renton refrain from
effectively denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to
open and operate an adult theater within the city." Adult
theaters have to compete in the real estate market like anyone
else, Rehnquist stated, and the Court has "never suggested that
the First Amendment compels the government to ensure that
adult theaters, or any other kinds of speech-related businesses
for that matter, will be able to obtain sites at bargain
prices."8 Justice Brennan's dissent challenged this line of
reasoning, arguing that adult theaters were clearly not able to
compete in the real estate market on equal footing with the
others because they alone were restricted to sites in the 520
acre area reserved for adult businesses.
The majority opinion means that cities may restrict the loca
tion of adult businesses providing the restrictions allow such
businesses a "reasonable opportunity" to operate. While such
language can be read as granting courts a great deal of leeway
in deciding individual cases-reasonableness, after all, is not
a term subject to precise definition-the tone of the opinion
calls for less stringent judicial review of the probable effect of
restrictions on adult businesses. Based on the facts in Renton,
for example, such factors as incompatible neighboring uses,
lack of existing suitable structures, and distance from
established retail and commercial districts are irrelevant so
long as the restricted area contains sufficient vacant or devel
oped land, is accessible by road, and presumably is eligible for
utility services.
At minimum, Renton places the burden of proof on those
challenging an adult-business ordinance to prove that its loca
tional restrictions preclude a "reasonable opportunity" to
operate in that -community. If a party challenging an or
dinance can make a strong, uncontradicted factual showing
that the restrictions severely restrict or effectively prohibit
adult businesses from operating, the Renton decision clearly
empowers a court to invalidate the ordinance. What is troubl
ing about the decision, however, is that it may encourage cities
to play a game of "chicken" with the courts to see how far adult
businesses may be restricted before a court objects. Unfor
tunately, the goal is to use zoning impermissibly as a technique
for eliminating adult businesses, and, because reasonableness
is such an elusive term, the Renton decision has made that
easier.
Studies from Other Communities
Mini Theatres also sought to guard against ordinances that are
8. 106 S.Ct. at 932.
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motivated by a distaste for constitutionally protected forms
of expression by requiring that communities demonstrate the
adverse effects on neighborhoods associated with adult
businesses and narrowly tailor their restrictions to further the
specific governmental interests endangered by the presence of
such businesses. In a number of subsequent cases, courts
struck down ordinances in part because the city had not de
veloped an adequate factual record or had relied on the find
ings of other communities rather than conducting its own
studies. For example, in CLR Corp. v. Henline, 520 F.Supp.
760(W.D. Mich.1981), 34ZD59, aff'd702F.2d637(6th Cir.
1983), the federal trial court invalidated an adult-use or
dinance partially on the absence of any legislative history or
factual background for the ordinance, in spite of the city's
claim that it could rely on the experience of Detroit and other
cities.
In Renton, the city relied on the factual findings and ex
perience of Seattle and Detroit, rather than making any find
ings of its own. The Ninth Circuit had ruled that, because the
Renton ordinance was enacted without the benefit of studies
specifically relating to "the particular problems or needs of
Renton," the city's justifications for the ordinance were ''con
clusory and speculative." Renton had presented a very thin
record to support its enactment of the ordinance. To uphold
the substantiality of Renton's governmental interest, the
district court had to rely on Renton's recitation of the ex
perience of other cities, particularly Detroit and Seattle. The
Ninth Circuit found this reliance misplaced, ruling that Ren
ton had not studied the effects of adult theaters and applied
those findings to the specific problems of Renton. In par
ticular, the Detroit experience, involving the problems raised
by a concentration of adult uses, was irrelevant to Renton's
stated interest in isolating adult theaters from residential
districts and certain other uses. The appeals court stopped
short of ruling that Renton could not use the experiences of
other cities as part of its findings in support of the ordinance,
but found that "in this case those experiences simply are not
sufficient to sustain Renton's burden of showing a significant
governmental interest.'"' The majority rejected this argu
ment, claiming that it imposed an "unnecessarily rigid burden
of proof" on the city, and held that Renton was justified in
relying on the experience of other cities. To guide courts in the
future on this issue, the majority stated: "The First Amend
ment does not require a city, before enacting such an or
dinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence
independent of that already generated by other cities, so long
as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses."
This "reasonable belief" standard for adopting another
city's experience with adult businesses suffers from the same
shortcomings as the "reasonable opportunity" standard
discussed previously. The majority opinion provides only
minimal guidance on how to administer the standard. Justice
Rehnquist noted that, in this case, Seattle had shared Renton's
concern with preventing the secondary effects caused by the
presence of even one adult theater in a given neighborhood,
that Renton had relied heavily on the "detailed findings" de
veloped by Seattle, and that it was irrelevant that Renton
ultimately chose a different method of adult theater zoning
than that chosen by Seattle. This suggests that cities may safely
rely on the experience of other communities if the problems
9. 74SF.2dat537.

addressed in the two cities are similar and there are "detailed
findings" about the effects of adult businesses. Courts will
probably also require a city relying on another community's
experience to offer some reasonable justification for doing so.
This does not mean that a city is totally free to forego its own
fact-finding, however. For example, a court would have lit
tle trouble in striking down an ordinance that justified its
regulation of a single adult bookstore by relying on the ex
perience of Detroit with the negative effects of a concentration
of adult businesses.
Taken together, the two "reasonableness" standards for
judging adult-business ordinances would seem to make it quite
simple for many communities to make the operation of adult
businesses difficult, it not impossible, even though they are
purportedly protected by the First Amendment. Consider the
following scenario. Centreville, a hypothetical small city of
32,000, has no adult businesses. When city officials learn that
one of the two theaters in the community may begin exhibiting
adult movies, the city council enacts an adult-business or
dinance. The ordinance recites the experience of Seattle with
the negative effects that the presence of a single adult theater
can have on a neighborhood and, based on a statement that
city officials "reasonably believe" that experience relates to
their situation, restricts the location of adult theaters to an iso
lated comer of the community. The ordinance further recites
that 520 acres are available for the location of adult theaters
in the area, that the area is well-served by roads, and that both
vacant land and developed buildings are "ample" and
''available" there. The ordinance concludes that a "reasonable
opportunity" exists in the area for the operation of an adult
theater.
This, of course, is the Renton case. What some may find
troubling about this scenario is that it permits a city to treat
two theater operators totally differently, depending entirely
on the content of the movies they intend to exhibit. The Mini
Theatres opinion granted communities the right to prevent the
neighborhood blight caused by a concentration of adult
businesses if they could show the problem existed in their com
munity and if the restrictions they imposed did not lessen ac
cess to this form of protected speech. Renton now effectively
grants communities the power to ban the use of any existing
theater for the exhibition of adult movies without any
justification based on the conditions in that community and
without any assurance that a new location would be commer
cially viable. The decision is a boon to those opposed to adult
business and a disaster for those concerned with unjustified
government intrusion upon rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment.
OTHER ISSUES
Although not an issue in the Renton case, amortization. pro
visions warrant discussion at this point, since the courts' treat
ment of such provisions may be affected by the decision. Most
cities that have enacted adult-business ordinances have made
the restrictions prospective only, allowing existing businesses
to continue to operate as nonconforming uses. 10 In the vast
majority of states, however, there is no constitutional bar to
requiring such nonconforming uses to cease operation or to
relocate within a reasonable time limit. The general rule for
10. See e.g., Texas National Theatres v. City of Albuquerque, 639 P.2d
509 (N.M. 1982)(general rule is that nonconforming uses in existence at the
time of amendment of the zoning ordinance may be continued).
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determining the reasonableness of an amortization period is
whether the probable benefit to the community from closing
the business outweighs the hardship incurred by the operator
from such a closing. Thus, for example, in Northend Cinema
v. City of Seattle, 585P.2d1153 (Wash. 1978), 31ZD 179, the
Supreme Court of Washington upheld a Seattle adult-business
zoning ordinance that had the effect of requiring the concen
tration of adult uses and that included a provision terminating
any nonconforming adult business within 90 days. The court
found the 90-day amortization period reasonable as applied
to a number of adult theaters because none of the theaters was
bound by its lease to exhibit adult films nor were the theaters
bound to remain at their existing locations. Accordingly, the
court concluded that the public benefit from the termination
of these uses outweighed the merely speculative harm asserted
by the theater operators. Other courts have upheld amortiza
tion provisions of varying lengths. 11
In cases where amortization provisions have been com
bined with severe locational restrictions on adult businesses,
however, the ordinances have been struck down. In Alex
anderv. City ofMinneapolis, 698F.2d 936 (8th Cir.1983), for
example, the court invalidated an ordinance that provided a
three-month amortization period for adult businesses. The
court found that over 30 adult businesses would have to be ter
minated by the end of the amortization period, but, because
of the severe locational restrictions in the ordinance, there
were only a limited number of available sites left in the city to
which these businesses could relocate. On these facts, the
court found that the ordinance was an excessive restriction on
constitutionally protected speech and invalidated it. 12
These cases suggest that the courts may treat ordinances em
bodying locational restrictions modeled on the Renton case
more harshly if they contain amortization provisions rather
than allowing nonconforming uses to remain in operation.
Courts may find it valid to restrict future adult businesses to
areas where they have a "reasonable opportunity" to operate,
but may well draw the line if, in addition, existing businesses
are required to terminate their operation at existing sites. The
greater the number of existing businesses affected by the or
dinance, the more likely that it will be invalidated, despite the
Supreme Court's decision in Renton.
The Renton case left undisturbed the two remaining rules
that could be derived from Mini Theatres and subsequent
cases. First, courts have not hesitated to strike down or
dinances that were vague or overbroad. Adult-business or
dinances must show great precision in their language,
particularly in the text of definitions and standards for deter
11. See e.g., Hurt Bookstoresv. Edmisten, 612F.2d821 (4th Cir. 1979)(six
months); Castner v. City of Oakland, 180 Cal.Rptr. 682 (Cal. App. 1982),
34ZD172, (one-year amortization period for nonconforming uses that fail
to obtain a conditional use permit, with additional one-year grace period for
adult businesses that demonstrate economic hardship).
12. SeealsoPurpleOnionv.Jackson, 511F.Supp.1207(N.D. Ga.1981),
34ZD7.
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mining what is and what is not regulated. Ordinances that
leave the subjects of regulation unclear or that use definitions
so broad that uses other than adult businesses come within the
regulations will be routinely invalidated. For example, in the
Purple Onion case, the Atlanta ordinance defined "adult
bookstore" and "adult movie theater" so loosely that, in the
view of the court, the definitions could include the federal
courthouse, a large number of private homes and apartments,
and downtown hotels that offered adult movies on cable
television in guest rooms. 13 The court ruled that the defini
tions were constitutionally impermissible because they were
substantially overbroad.
Renton also was silent on the issue of ordinances that create
an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of expression.
The prior restraint problem arises when ordinances grant gov
ernment officials discretionary powers to determine whether
an adult business will be permitted to operate. Typically, such
ordinances use special permits or business-licensing re
quirements that allow officials to grant or deny an adult busi
ness permission to open. The courts have generally been quite
hostile to such provisions. In County of Cook v. World Wide
News Agency, 424N.E.2d1173 (Ill. 1981), 34ZD10, for ex
ample, an amendment to the Cook County zoning ordinance
made adult businesses special uses that required the issuance
of a special use permit. The court struck down the ordinance
as a prior restraint on freedom of expression, noting that the
county board had unbridled discretion to grant or deny the
permit.
SUMMARY
The majority opinion in Renton directs courts to give more
deference to the "reasonable" decisions of government officials
when they place restrictions on adult businesses. Cities now
have no need to conduct their own studies on the effects of
adult businesses in their community, but may rely on the ex
periences of other cities that are reasonably related to their
own conditions. Cities may also preclude adult businesses,
particularly adult theaters, from using existing facilities and
restrict their location to outlying areas, so long as the restricted
area is reasonably capable of being developed for adult
business use. Renton thus appears to signal a major change in
the courts' treatment of adult-business ordinances. We should
now expect to see far less judicial hostility toward ordinances
that place significant restrictions on such businesses, although
the courts do remain free to strike down ordinances that are
vague, create a system of prior restraints on speech, or restrict
adult businesses to such an extent that it cannot reasonably be
said that this form of expression has not been effectively
banned.
13. The basic problem with the definitions was that they failed to
distinguish between the commercial display and sale of sexually oriented ma
terial in adult businesses and the presence of such materials in dwellings, of
fices, or institutions. See Purple Onion v. Jackson, 511F.Supp.1207 (N.D.
Ga. 1981), 34 ZD 7.
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